The Future of Democracy Lies in Our Instincts
- Nathan J. Murphy
- 44 minutes ago
- 20 min read
Liberal democracy is on the back foot. Across America, Britain, and much of the democratic world, inequality is deepening, trust in institutions is collapsing, and populist and illiberal movements are gaining ground. In the UK, only 45% of citizens now believe democracy works well, while in the United States nearly one-third doubt whether it remains viable. 1–5 Across Europe, faith in democratic institutions has fallen to its lowest level in decades as far-right parties advance and “illiberal democracy” becomes an openly declared model. These are not isolated disruptions but cumulative evidence of a legitimacy crisis — a collapse of trust at the democratic centre that signals rising political instability. The rise of the extremes is not the cause of this erosion but its consequence.
As faith in democracy falters, the political centre offers little more than piecemeal fixes while the public hungers for bold change and a convincing vision of the future. This is not simply a failure of leaders or policies. Its roots lie in the flawed assumptions at the heart of the post-war liberal consensus; a framework designed for a world recovering from catastrophe. That settlement once delivered peace and prosperity; now, overextended and outdated, it has become part of the problem.
If the twentieth century gave us the ideas to rebuild after war, the twenty-first demands something equally foundational: a renewal of faith in democracy itself. Our short book, Liberalism That Wins: A New Foundation for Democratic Renewal (Prepolitica, 2025), argues for such a renewal — a framework grounded not in abstract ideals but in how human beings actually think, feel, and live together. What we call Scientific Liberalismfn1 offers a way to restore legitimacy, rebuild trust, and out-compete the extremes by grounding politics in our evolved moral instincts: fairness, care, cooperation, and the need for belonging within groups.
Where We Are: The Erosion of Legitimacy
In the aftermath of World War II’s destruction, the victorious democracies built a system designed to secure stability, cooperation, and shared prosperity. The post-war liberal order combined democracy, capitalism, human rights, and social welfare — and for decades, it delivered. 6–8 Living standards rose, democratic institutions spread, wars between major powers were avoided, and the world became vastly more prosperous.
But legitimacy is now faltering. Today, the threats are not primarily external; they are internal contradictions that have deepened over decades.
Economic globalisation, once hailed as a guarantor of peace and prosperity, has delivered mixed results. It lifted millions out of poverty in developing countries, but in the West it hollowed out industry, eroded working-class communities, and concentrated wealth at levels not seen since the nineteenth century.9–16 Financialisation, outsourcing, and the prioritisation of capital over labour have entrenched inequality and left entire regions behind.
Corruption has become institutionalised, with political funding and economic systems tilted against the majority.17–25 Meritocracy, long promoted as a fairer alternative to hereditary privilege, has developed its own distortions.26–28 A credentialed elite now defines “merit” on its own terms, turning education into a costly barrier rather than a ladder of opportunity, while technocratic governance — its natural extension — has further insulated political and economic decision-making from public accountability.26–28
Mass immigration, another feature of globalisation, has brought economic benefits, but these have not been evenly shared. Gains have often flowed to those at the top, while costs — from wage suppression to pressure on housing, services, and cultural cohesion — have been borne disproportionately by those with less. 29–39 Where mainstream leaders dismissed these concerns as prejudice, they deepened resentment and fuelled the rise of far-right movements. 40–43
Meanwhile, sovereignty itself has been eroded. As more decisions are ceded to global markets, treaties, and supranational institutions, many citizens feel that their votes no longer shape outcomes.
These pressures converge in a deep sense of helplessness: wages stagnant, costs rising, services declining, politics unresponsive.44–48 For too long, centrist leaders have responded with technocratic fixes and managerialism — essentially offering “more of the same.”
The result is a legitimacy crisis. The post-war liberal consensus, once stabilising, has ossified into an ideology that no longer matches lived reality. Where citizens perceive unfairness, neglect, or exclusion, trust evaporates. And when legitimacy fails, governments must increasingly rely on force — through propaganda, spin, policing, or repression. Force may preserve order briefly, but it is always costly, destabilising, and corrosive of freedom.
Illiberal movements exploit the vacuum. From Brexit to Trump, from Orbán to Le Pen, the boldest visions now on offer are openly hostile to liberal democracy itself. The lesson is clear: defending the old order is not enough. Liberal democracy must be rebuilt on firmer moral and intellectual foundations — foundations capable of supporting a coherent and inspiring vision of the future.
Reframing Politics: The Four Questions of Group
To meet today’s crisis, we must start deeper than policy. Political movements are not just the promotion of programmes but an answer to what we call the four questions of group:
Questions of Group | In other words… |
What is society for? (Purpose) | Why are we cooperating? |
How to structure society? (Form) | What does cooperation look like? |
What is progress? (Direction) | Where are we going? |
How do we define the group? (Identity) | Who are we? (And who isn’t?) |
Every political movement, consciously or not, answers these questions. But many of today’s ideologies do so poorly or evasively. Individualistic movements often sidestep collective purpose entirely, insisting society exists only to protect individual liberty. Egalitarian movements sometimes avoid defining group identity, wary of exclusion or of being seen as essentialising difference. The far right romanticises a fictional past, delivering regression in the name of restoration.
Scientific Liberalism shows that answering these questions coherently is not just an academic exercise but the key to rebuilding legitimacy. By grounding “purpose,” “form,” “direction,” and “identity” in evolved moral instincts, we can offer a vision that is credible to both progressives and conservatives — fairness and care for the former; belonging and competitiveness for the latter.
Such avoidance creates blind spots. A movement that promises enrichment while measuring progress only by stock market growth creates deep fault lines. Individualist ideologies evade shared purpose altogether; egalitarian ones hesitate to define identity; reactionary nationalism answers identity with exclusion and direction with regression, sustained by force.
The post-war consensus gave answers too, but partial and fragile ones: prosperity through markets and welfare management; progress as growth and integration; identity grounded in universal rights but leaving national belonging unresolved. This framework worked for decades, but its limits are now exposed.
To renew legitimacy, we must answer the four questions of group more clearly, and on firmer ground. That ground is human nature.
Human Nature as a Political Foundation
Scientific Liberalism begins with a simple but empirically supported claim: humans are innately moral.49–58 Our brains are wired with moral instincts — evolved preferences that shape how we interact, what we find legitimate, and what we resist.59
Political theory has long debated human nature — from Hobbesian scepticism to Rousseau’s optimism to modern constructivist views that treat morality as socially produced. Scientific Liberalism does not enter that debate as ideology but as evidence. Its claim is functional rather than deterministic: societies are more legitimate and competitive when they align with the moral psychology revealed by behavioural and evolutionary science. This framework treats biology as a foundation, not a cage — a starting condition that political systems must work with, not surrender to.
These instincts are not cultural inventions or ideological fictions. They emerge early in life, recur across societies, and show signs of heritability. Like our taste for sugar or fat, they are part of our species’ evolutionary inheritance.
The evidence converges on four core instincts:
Fairness – “fairness is better than unfairness.” We recoil at injustice, reward reciprocity, and even punish cheaters at personal cost. Fairness sustains trust; when denied, legitimacy collapses.60–69
Cooperation – “cooperation is better than non-cooperation.” From infant helping behaviour to the neural rewards of teamwork, we are wired to collaborate.70–87 Highly cooperative societies are more efficient, resilient, and competitive.88–92
Care – “caring is better than uncaring.” Empathy is an innate human behaviour that binds people together through concern and support, but it is also selective — strongest within perceived group boundaries and often diminished or reversed toward outsiders.93–109
Group Preference – humans are adapted to live in groups, bound by loyalty and solidarity. This instinct stabilises societies but can also fuel exclusion and conflict.80,110–128
Rather than moralising against belonging, Scientific Liberalism proposes to harness it. Liberal societies can do this through inclusive civic identities, shared institutions, and fair rules that expand — rather than suppress — the circle of belonging. When group preference is balanced with fairness and care it becomes a stabilising, not a divisive, force.
Yet when group preference is over-indexed — pursued in ways that are unfair, uncaring, or uncooperative — it degenerates into exclusion, cruelty, and domination. Such distortions are not merely immoral; they are politically self-defeating. They erode trust, corrode institutions, and destroy the very legitimacy that stable societies depend on. Scientific Liberalism therefore treats belonging as a moral resource that must be ethically balanced, not weaponised. By aligning group preference with fairness, care, and cooperation, liberal democracies can sustain both cohesion and freedom without sliding into tribalism or authoritarian control.
For progressives, the lesson is clear: group belonging is not a relic to transcend but a human need to answer. When progressives neglect it, others will fill the void — often with answers that divide rather than unite.
Together these four instincts form a universal moral architecture. They define our base political interests: the conditions societies must meet to feel psychologically satisfying.
The Human Social Model — distilled to essence — describes how these evolved instincts interact to confer competitive advantage.
Legitimacy and Competitiveness
Political systems are most stable and legitimate when they reflect these instincts. People willingly accept and invest in systems that feel fair, caring, cooperative, and that respect group belonging.77,129–135 Where instincts are ignored, states must rely on coercion to maintain cooperation.136,137
Coercion — whether through propaganda or force — is always costly and destabilising, diverting energy and resources away from social provision and development. By contrast, moral alignment reduces friction, broadens participation, and unlocks human potential. The same instincts that once secured survival now determine which societies thrive.
Policy that embodies these instincts — fair tax systems, cooperative investment in public goods, caring health and education frameworks, and civic institutions that respect belonging — does not merely “feel better”; it works better, generating both legitimacy and competitiveness.
The lesson is that legitimacy and competitiveness are not separate goals but two sides of the same coin, each rooted in alignment with evolved moral nature.
This moral alignment is not abstract. It has concrete implications for how we design our institutions. A fair, caring, and cooperative society is not an abstraction: its principles can be built into the design of everyday systems. In criminal justice, a fairness–care balance points towards rehabilitation over retribution — prisons that restore cooperation and reciprocity rather than perpetuate cycles of harm. In housing, cooperation and care translate into long-term social investment — treating secure homes as civic infrastructure that sustains participation and trust, making affordability and stability moral imperatives rather than market outcomes. In each case, Scientific Liberalism offers a test: does this institution feel fair, care for those within it, fostercooperation, and respect group preference? If not, it will eventually lose trust and competitive vitality.
Social Design: Towards a Liberalism That Wins
Grounding politics in human nature allows us to re-answer the four questions of group with clarity:
Purpose: To create a fair and caring environment
Form: To be as cooperative as possible while upholding fairness and care, and respecting group preference.
Direction: Towards a more cooperative, fairer, and more caring group.
Identity: groups defined in ways that uphold fairness and care, while recognising boundaries are necessary
Stable societies are like a three-legged stool: fairness, care, and cooperation are the legs; group preference is the seat that provides the context in which these instincts are enacted. Remove one, or overextend it at the expense of the others, and stability falters. Overemphasise markets while neglecting care, and inequality corrodes trust. Overemphasise care through heavy-handed regulation that undermines cooperation, and competitiveness diminishes. Ignore group belonging, and resentment festers. Every one-legged ideology — whether libertarianism, nationalism, communism, or laissez-faire capitalism — ultimately results in political instability.
The result of alignment is not only moral appeal but competitive strength. Societies succeed when their institutions — however imperfect — embody fairness, care, cooperation, and belonging.
This is the promise — a framework grounded in the human condition, capable of restoring legitimacy at home and ensuring competitiveness abroad. It offers the possibility to reunite the democratic centre, drawing strength from both traditions. To progressives, it affirms that fairness and care are not optional virtues but essential foundations of stability. To conservatives, it recognises that belonging and competitiveness are equally fundamental, rooted in human nature rather than ideology. By holding these instincts in balance, it moves beyond the tired battles of left and right, offering shared ground on which a renewed democratic order can be built.
The task before us is not to preserve liberal democracy as a museum piece, but to make it once again the most dynamic and convincing vision of the future. That requires an approach that is scientifically grounded, morally resonant, and strategically competitive. This is not compromise but renewal — a strategy that wins by being more legitimate, more resilient, and more competitive than its rivals.
Footnote 1: Here, “scientific” does not imply certainty, ideological infallibility, or reducing politics to technical management. It denotes an empirical, adaptive, and fallible method, grounded in observed human behaviour and converging evidence from multiple fields. The aim is to anchor moral reasoning in a realistic understanding of human nature — making political systems more legitimate, resilient, and humane.
Bibliography
1. Claassen, C. & Magalhães, P. C. Public Support for Democracy in the United States Has Declined Generationally. Public Opinion Quarterly 87, 719– 732 (2023).
2. Center for Politics. Voice of the Voter Survey. (October 2023).
3. Sozan, M. An American Democracy Built for the People: Why Democracy Matters and How To Make It Work for the 21st Century.
4. Silver, L. & Fetterolf, J. Who Likes Authoritarianism, and How Do They Want to Change Their Government?
5. Trust and confidence in Britain’s system of government at record low. National Centre for Social Research Preprint at (2024).
6. Pettersson, T. & Wallensteen, P. Armed conflicts, 1946–2014. Journal of Peace Research 52, 536–550 (2015).
7. Eriksson, M. & Wallensteen, P. Armed Conflict, 1989–2003. Journal of Peace Research 41, 625–636 (2004).
8. Lacina, B. & Gleditsch, N. P. The Waning of War is Real. Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, 1109–1127 (2013).
9. Inequality Growth and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization and Globalization. (Oxford University PressOxford, 2004). doi:10.1093/0199271410.001.0001.
10. Inequalities in Household Wealth across OECD Countries. doi:10.1787/7e1bf673-en.
11. Chancel, L., Thomas, P., Saez, E. & Zucman, G. World Inequality Report 2022.
12. Aghelmaleki, H., Bachmann, R. & Stiebale, J. The China Shock, Employment Protection, and European Jobs. ILR Review75, 1269–1293 (2022).
13. Colantone, I. & Stanig, P. Global Competition and Brexit. American Political Science Review 112, 201–218 (2018).
14. Tridico, P. The determinants of income inequality in OECD countries. Cambridge Journal of Economics 42, 1009–1042 (2018).
15. Jaumotte, F. & Osorio-Buitron, C. Inequality and Labor Market Institutions. SSRN Electronic Journal (2015) doi:10.2139/ssrn.2678639.
16. Palladino, L. Financialization at work: Shareholder primacy and stagnant wages in the United States. Competition & Change 25, 382–400 (2021).
17. McSweeney, D. Parties, Corruption and Campaign Finance in America. in Party Finance and Political Corruption 37–60 (Palgrave Macmillan UK, London, 2000).
18. Evertsson, N. Political Corruption and Campaign Financing. (US-AB Stockholm University, Stockholm , 2008).
19. Total Spending of Presidential Candidates in Major Political Parties in the United States from 1984 to 2024.
20. Total Cost of Election (1990-2024).
21. Katz, L. F. & Krueger, A. B. Documenting decline in U.S. economic mobility. Science 356, 382–383 (2017).
22. Rank, M. R., Eppard, L. M. & Bullock, H. E. The United States Is No Longer a Land of Upward Mobility and Opportunity. in Poorly Understood 127–135 (Oxford University PressNew York, 2021).
23. Miller, D. & Dinan, W. Revolving Doors, Accountability and Transparency - Emerging Regulatory Concerns and Policy Solutions in the Financial Crisis. in (2009).
24. Baker, A. Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and trajectories of change in global financial governance. International Affairs 86, 647–663 (2010).
25. Milanovic, B. How the System Was Rigged. Foreign Affairs (2022).
26. Sandel, M. J. The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good? (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020).
27. Young, T. The Rise of the Genotocracy. The Political Quarterly 91, 388–396 (2020).
28. Pelloni, A. Use every man after his desert , and who should ‘ scape whipping ? “ ( Hamlet ). in (2022).
29. Buss, J. A. Have the Poor Gotten Poorer?: The American Experience from 1987 to 2007. Journal of Poverty 14, 183–196 (2010).
30. Meara, E. & Skinner, J. Losing ground at midlife in America. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112, 15006–15007 (2015).
31. Harvey, L. & Rockey, J. C. The Declining Fortunes of (Most) American Workers. SSRN Electronic Journal (2020).
32. Hills, J., Cunliffe, J., Obolenskaya, P. & Karagiannaki, E. Falling Behind, Getting Ahead: The Changing Structure of Inequality in the UK, 2007-2013 .
33. Nolan, B. Generating Prosperity for Working Families in Affluent Countries. vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2018).
34. Costa, R. P. & Machin, S. J. Real Wages and Living Standards in the UK. in (2017).
35. Blanchflower, D. G., Costa, R. P. & Machin, S. J. The Return of Falling Real Wages. in (2017).
36. Cortes, P. The Effect of Low-Skilled Immigration on US Prices: Evidence from CPI Data. SSRN Electronic Journal(2006).
37. Orrenius, P. M. & Zavodny, M. Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Look at Occupation-Level Evidence. SSRN Electronic Journal (2003).
38. Altonji, J. G. & Card, D. The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of Less-skilled Natives. in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the New Immigration 137–170 (Routledge, 2018).
39. Nickell, S. & Saleheen, J. The Impact of Immigration on Occupational Wages: Evidence from Britain. SSRN Electronic Journal (2008).
40. Huddleston. Thomas. Europe: Immigration Now Public’s Top Priority at EU and National Level.
41. Hermsmeier, L. Germany Has a Problem. New York Times (2023).
42. European Commission. EU Barometer Report Autumn 2015.
43. Nurdin, A., Setiawan, A. & Nugraha, A. R. The Rise of Populism and Its Impact on Democratic Institutions: A Comparative Analysis of Global Trends. International Journal of Social and Human 1, 67–78 (2024).
44. Pessoa, J. P. & Reenen, J. Van. Decoupling of Wage Growth and Productivity Growth? Myth and Reality. in (2013).
45. Blanchflower, D. G. & Machin, S. J. Falling real wages. CentrePiece-The Magazine for Economic Performance (2014).
46. Gregg, P., Machin, S. & Fernández-Salgado, M. Real Wages and Unemployment in the Big Squeeze. The Economic Journal 124, 408–432 (2014).
47. Standing, G. The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay. in (2016).
48. Lee, Y., Kemp, P. A. & Reina, V. J. Drivers of housing (un)affordability in the advanced economies: a review and new evidence. Housing Studies 37, 1739–1752 (2022).
49. Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M. & Cohen, J. D. The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment. Neuron 44, 389–400 (2004).
50. Moll, J. & de Oliveira-Souza, R. Moral judgments, emotions and the utilitarian brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11, 319–321 (2007).
51. Young, L. & Koenigs, M. Investigating emotion in moral cognition: a review of evidence from functional neuroimaging and neuropsychology. British Medical Bulletin 84, 69–79 (2007).
52. Fumagalli, M. & Priori, A. Functional and clinical neuroanatomy of morality. Brain 135, 2006–2021 (2012).
53. Mendez, M. F. The Neurobiology of Moral Behavior: Review and Neuropsychiatric Implications. CNS Spectrums 14, 608–620 (2009).
54. The Moral Brain: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. vol. 53 (2015).
55. Moll, J. et al. The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions. The Journal of Neuroscience 22, 2730–2736 (2002).
56. Hamlin, J. K. Moral Judgment and Action in Preverbal Infants and Toddlers. Current Directions in Psychological Science22, 186–193 (2013).
57. Pascual, L., Rodrigues, P. & Gallardo-Pujol, D. How does morality work in the brain? A functional and structural perspective of moral behavior. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 7, (2013).
58. Schaich Borg, J., Hynes, C., Van Horn, J., Grafton, S. & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in Moral Judgments: An fMRI Investigation. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18, 803–817 (2006).
59. Funk, C. M. & Gazzaniga, M. S. The functional brain architecture of human morality. Current Opinion in Neurobiology19, 678–681 (2009).
60. Warneken, F. & Tomasello, M. Altruistic Helping in Human Infants and Young Chimpanzees. Science 311, 1301–1303 (2006).
61. McAuliffe, K., Blake, P. R., Steinbeis, N. & Warneken, F. The developmental foundations of human fairness. Nature Human Behaviour 1, 0042 (2017).
62. Henrich, J. et al. Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment. Science 327, 1480–1484 (2010).
63. Geraci, A. & Surian, L. The developmental roots of fairness: infants’ reactions to equal and unequal distributions of resources. Developmental Science 14, 1012–1020 (2011).
64. Tabibnia, G., Satpute, A. B. & Lieberman, M. D. The Sunny Side of Fairness. Psychological Science 19, 339–347 (2008).
65. Hauser, M., McAuliffe, K. & Blake, P. R. Evolving the ingredients for reciprocity and spite. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 364, 3255–3266 (2009).
66. Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E. & Cohen, J. D. The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game. Science 300, 1755–1758 (2003).
67. Feng, C., Luo, Y. & Krueger, F. Neural signatures of fairness‐related normative decision making in the ultimatum game: A coordinate‐based meta‐analysis. Human Brain Mapping 36, 591–602 (2015).
68. Cappelen, A. W., Nielsen, U. H., Tungodden, B., Tyran, J.-R. & Wengstrrm, E. Fairness is Intuitive. SSRN Electronic Journal (2014) doi:10.2139/ssrn.2430774.
69. Wang, Y. et al. Born for fairness: evidence of genetic contribution to a neural basis of fairness intuition. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 14, 539–548 (2019).
70. McAllister, D. J. Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations. Academy of Management Journal 38, 24–59 (1995).
71. Ferrin, D. L., Bligh, M. C. & Kohles, J. C. Can I Trust You to Trust Me? Group & Organization Management 32, 465–499 (2007).
72. Zer, Z. & Zheng, Y. Trust and Trustworthiness. SSRN Electronic Journal (2017) doi:10.2139/ssrn.3046303.
73. Lorenz, E. Trust, contract and economic cooperation. Cambridge Journal of Economics 23, 301–315 (1999).
74. Jones, G. R. & George, J. M. The Experience and Evolution of Trust: Implications for Cooperation and Teamwork. Academy of Management Review 23, 531–546 (1998).
75. Yamagishi, T., Kanazawa, S., Mashima, R. & Terai, S. Separating Trust from Cooperation in a Dynamic Relationship. Rationality and Society 17, 275–308 (2005).
76. Tomasello, M. Why We Cooperate. (The MIT Press, 2009).
77. Tabibnia, G. & Lieberman, M. D. Fairness and Cooperation Are Rewarding. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences1118, 90–101 (2007).
78. Xia, N. & Li, H. Loneliness, Social Isolation, and Cardiovascular Health. Antioxidants & Redox Signaling 28, 837–851 (2018).
79. Litt, E., Zhao, S., Kraut, R. & Burke, M. What Are Meaningful Social Interactions in Today’s Media Landscape? A Cross-Cultural Survey. Social Media + Society 6, 205630512094288 (2020).
80. Cole, S. W. et al. Myeloid differentiation architecture of leukocyte transcriptome dynamics in perceived social isolation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112, 15142–15147 (2015).
81. Lee, C. R., Chen, A. & Tye, K. M. The neural circuitry of social homeostasis: Consequences of acute versus chronic social isolation. Cell 184, 1500–1516 (2021).
82. Tomasello, M. A Natural History of Human Morality. (Harvard University Press, 2016).
83. Tomasello, M. A Natural History of Human Thinking. (Harvard University Press, 2014). doi:10.4159/9780674726369.
84. Oesch, N. Social Brain Perspectives on the Social and Evolutionary Neuroscience of Human Language. Brain Sciences14, 166 (2024).
85. MacLaren, N. G., Meng, L., Collier, M. & Masuda, N. Cooperation and the social brain hypothesis in primate social networks. Frontiers in Complex Systems 1, (2024).
86. Hrdy, S. B. Evolutionary Context of Human Development: The Cooperative Breeding Model. in Family Relationships39–68 (Oxford University PressNew York, 2007). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195320510.003.0003.
87. Kramer, K. L. & Otárola-Castillo, E. When mothers need others: The impact of hominin life history evolution on cooperative breeding. Journal of Human Evolution 84, 16–24 (2015).
88. Pervaiz, Z. & Chaudhary, A. R. Social Cohesion and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation. Australian Economic Review 48, 369–381 (2015).
89. Rodrik, D. Participatory Politics, Social Cooperation, and Economic Stability. American Economic Review 90, 140–144 (2000).
90. Whiteley, P. F. Economic Growth and Social Capital. Political Studies 48, 443–466 (2000).
91. Sztaudynger, J. J., Ambroziak, E. & Starosta, P. Generalized Trust, Helpfulness, Fairness and Growth in European Countries A Revised Analysis. Comparative Economic Research. Central and Eastern Europe 25, 135–160 (2022).
92. Fukuyama, F. Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda. SAIS Review 22, 23–37 (2002).
93. Meyer, M. L. et al. Empathy for the social suffering of friends and strangers recruits distinct patterns of brain activation. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 8, 446–454 (2013).
94. Vaughn, D. A., Savjani, R. R., Cohen, M. S. & Eagleman, D. M. Empathic Neural Responses Predict Group Allegiance. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 12, (2018).
95. Singer, T. et al. Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others. Nature 439, 466–469 (2006).
96. Bloom, P. Empathy and Its Discontents. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 21, 24–31 (2017).
97. Cowell, J. M. et al. The development of generosity and moral cognition across five cultures. Developmental Science 20, (2017).
98. Wang, Z., Zhang, D. & Zheng, Z. Cross-Cultural Differences in Empathy and Relevant Factors. Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences 10, 197–202 (2023).
99. Rilling, J. K. et al. A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation. Neuron 35, 395–405 (2002).
100. Davidov, M., Zahn‐Waxler, C., Roth‐Hanania, R. & Knafo, A. Concern for Others in the First Year of Life: Theory, Evidence, and Avenues for Research. Child Development Perspectives 7, 126–131 (2013).
101. Liddle, M.-J. E., Bradley, B. S. & Mcgrath, A. Baby Empathy: Infant Distress and Peer Prosocial Responses. Infant Mental Health Journal 36, 446–458 (2015).
102. Roth-Hanania, R., Davidov, M. & Zahn-Waxler, C. Empathy development from 8 to 16 months: Early signs of concern for others. Infant Behavior and Development 34, 447–458 (2011).
103. Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. & Cohen, J. D. An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment. Science 293, 2105–2108 (2001).
104. Nitschke, J. B. et al. Orbitofrontal cortex tracks positive mood in mothers viewing pictures of their newborn infants. NeuroImage 21, 583–592 (2004).
105. Decety, J. & Svetlova, M. Putting together phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives on empathy. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 2, 1–24 (2012).
106. Tucker, D. M., Luu, P. & Derryberry, D. Love hurts: The evolution of empathic concern through the encephalization of nociceptive capacity. Development and Psychopathology 17, (2005).
107. Preston, S. D. & de Waal, F. B. M. Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25, 1–20 (2002).
108. Decety, J. The Neuroevolution of Empathy and Caring for Others: Why It Matters for Morality. in 127–151 (2014). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-02904-7_8.
109. Goetz, J. L., Keltner, D. & Simon-Thomas, E. Compassion: An evolutionary analysis and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin 136, 351–374 (2010).
110. Rilling, J. K., Dagenais, J. E., Goldsmith, D. R., Glenn, A. L. & Pagnoni, G. Social cognitive neural networks during in-group and out-group interactions. NeuroImage 41, 1447–1461 (2008).
111. Blascovich, J., Mendes, W. B., Hunter, S. B., Lickel, B. & Kowai-Bell, N. Perceiver threat in social interactions with stigmatized others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80, 253–267 (2001).
112. Maner, J. K. & Miller, S. L. Adaptive Attentional Attunement: Perceptions of Danger and Attention to Outgroup Men. Social Cognition 31, 733–744 (2013).
113. Ma, Y. & Tan, H. Representation of intergroup conflict in the human brain. Neuron 111, 1692–1696 (2023).
114. Van Bavel, J. J., Packer, D. J. & Cunningham, W. A. The Neural Substrates of In-Group Bias. Psychological Science 19, 1131–1139 (2008).
115. Lin, L. C., Qu, Y. & Telzer, E. H. Intergroup social influence on emotion processing in the brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, 10630–10635 (2018).
116. Greven, I. M. & Ramsey, R. Neural network integration during the perception of in-group and out-group members. Neuropsychologia 106, 225–235 (2017).
117. Crespi, B. J., Flinn, M. v. & Summers, K. Runaway Social Selection in Human Evolution. Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution 10, (2022).
118. Bergstrom, T. C. Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, 67–88 (2002).
119. Wilson, D. S. & Sober, E. Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, 585–608 (1994).
120. Hill, K. R. et al. Co-Residence Patterns in Hunter-Gatherer Societies Show Unique Human Social Structure. Science 331, 1286–1289 (2011).
121. Dunbar, R., Harcourt, A. H. & de Waal, F. B. M. Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals. Man 28, 370 (1993).
122. Caporael, L. R. The Evolution of Truly Social Cognition: The Core Configurations Model. Personality and Social Psychology Review 1, 276–298 (1997).
123. Bissonnette, A. et al. Coalitions in theory and reality: a review of pertinent variables and processes. Behaviour 152, 1–56 (2015).
124. Haslam, S. A. et al. Social identity makes group-based social connection possible: Implications for loneliness and mental health. Current Opinion in Psychology 43, 161–165 (2022).
125. Correll, J. & Park, B. A Model of the Ingroup as a Social Resource. Personality and Social Psychology Review 9, 341–359 (2005).
126. Hawkley, L. C. & Cacioppo, J. T. Loneliness Matters: A Theoretical and Empirical Review of Consequences and Mechanisms. Annals of Behavioral Medicine 40, 218–227 (2010).
127. Taijfel, H. Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientific American 223, 96–102 (1970).
128. Yang, X. & Dunham, Y. Minimal but meaningful: Probing the limits of randomly assigned social identities. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 185, 19–34 (2019).
129. Sääksvuori, L., Hariskos, W. & Neitzel, J. Fairness Views and Cooperation Under Varying Levels of Economic Inequality. SSRN Electronic Journal (2022).
130. Rothstein, B. & Uslaner, E. M. All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust. World Politics 58, 41–72 (2005).
131. You, J. Social Trust: Fairness Matters More Than Homogeneity. Political Psychology 33, 701–721 (2012).
132. Cozzolino, P. J. Trust, cooperation, and equality: A psychological analysis of the formation of social capital. British Journal of Social Psychology 50, 302–320 (2011).
133. Kawachi, I., Kennedy, B. P., Lochner, K. & Prothrow-Stith, D. Social capital, income inequality, and mortality. American Journal of Public Health 87, 1491–1498 (1997).
134. Brosnan, S. F. & de Waal, F. B. M. Evolution of responses to (un)fairness. Science 346, (2014).
135. Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U. & Gächter, S. Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature 13, 1–25 (2002).
136. Jacobs, D. & Britt, D. Inequality and Police Use of Deadly Force: An Empirical Assessment of a Conflict Hypothesis. Social Problems 26, 403–412 (1979).
137. Caprioli, M. & Trumbore, P. F. Ethnic Discrimination and Interstate Violence: Testing the International Impact of Domestic Behavior. Journal of Peace Research 40, 5–23 (2003).
About the Author
Nathan J. Murphy is a political thinker and philosopher working at the intersection of political theory, science, and philosophy. His work explores how evidence-based thinking can strengthen democracy in an age of crisis. He is the author of Liberalism That Wins and founder of Prepolitica — an organisation that applies science to political renewal.